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TOWARDS A PROPERTY RIGHT IN EMPLOYMENT
The institution of property is the embodiment of accidents,
events, and the wisdom of the past. It is before us as clay into which
we can introduce the coloration and configuration representing our
wisdom. How great, how useful this new ingredient may be will
largely determine the future happiness, and perhaps continued existence of our society.'
INTRODUCTION

A. The Nature of Property
In the layman's conception, a person's "property" is limited to
his ownership of "things." 2 However, the boundaries of the legal definition are far less constricting; 3 a limitation of "property" to physical
objects would be rigid and static, in conflict with the flexible nature
of the common law. Thus, in law, "property" may also refer to in4
tangible concepts such as thoughts and ideas.
Property, then, might be defined as a "legal institution, the essence of which is the creation and protection of certain private rights
in wealth of any kind." 5 It sets a "pattern of behavior" and fixes a "zone
of tolerance for some segment of human activity." 6 Property is a legal
construct, of an experiential nature, its content changing in response to
societal developments. 7 It took form in relation to a recognized social
problem, and as the problem varied with time, the response showed
"the results of new moulding.""
Ideally property law is a dynamic process, expanding and contracting to meet societal needs. But, like other institutions, there is a
tendency for responses to harden; answers to old problems remain, long
after they cease to serve a useful purpose.
Courts have a duty to reappraise old doctrines in the light of
the facts and values of contemporary life-particularly old common
1. 1 R. POWELL,

REAl. PROPERTY
15, at 38 (P. Rohan ed. 1969).
2. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 691

(1938).
3. A.

PORTER, JOB PROPERTY RIGHTS: A STUDY OF THE JOB CONTROLS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION 4 (1954).

4. An example of this is the law of patents, copyrights and trademarks.

5. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964).
6.

1 R. PowELL 6, at 7.

7. Id.

11, at 22-24.

8. Id. 6, at 7.
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law doctrines which the courts themselves created and developed....
"Whe continued vitality of the common law * * * depends upon
its ability to reflect contemporary community values and ethics."0
B. The Relation of Property to Employment

The law of master-servant exemplifies a law created for a
different era, persisting today. Employment is an at will relationship
where, in the absence of a specific statute or a contract for a definite
term, the master may arbitrarily discharge his servant without inter10
ference from the courts.
9. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
quoting Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
10. E.g., Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1964);
Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959); Odell v. Humble Oil & Ref.
Co., 201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir. 1953); McKinney v. Armco Steel Corp., 270 F. Supp.
360 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Electrical Workers v. General Elec. Co., 127 F. Supp. 934
(D.D.C. 1954); Patterson v. Philco Corp., 252 Cal. App. 2d 63, 60 Cal. Rptr. 110
(1st Dist. 1967); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 14 Misc. 2d 237, 178 N.Y.S.2d
846 (Sup. Ct. 1958). See generally 53 Am. JUR. 2d Master and Servant §§ 27-59 (1970) ;
Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise
of Employer Power, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 742 (1957);
Lecture by Ruth Weyand, Twenty-second Annual Conference on Labor, June 10, 1969,
in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE
ON LABOR 171 (T. Christensen & A. Christensen eds. 1970). See also Shaw v. Fisher,
113 S.C. 287, 102 S.E. 325 (1920). (While upholding the employer's right to discharge
at will, the court held that any state which prevented an employee from seeking other
employment would violate the thirteenth amendment prohibition of involuntary
servitude.)
The title master-servant is indicative of the state of the law. The relationship
is created by an expression of will by the master. Since the power is held for his benefit
and subject to his control, it can continue only so long as "his expression of willingness
for its continuance." W. SEAVEY, The Rationale of Agency, in STUDIES IN AGENCY
105 (1949).
The essence of the agency is the agent's duty of obedience, that is, a duty not
to act in the principal's affairs except in accordance with the principal's desires
as he had manifested them to the agent. It follows that the principal can
terminate the authority at any time, irrespective of his contractual obligations to the agent.
W. SEAvEY, LAW OF AGENCY 87 (1964).
Seavey also speculates on the rationale for the law of respondeat superior, believing
it to be based on an insurance concept. The master's activity is expanded by use of the
activity of others and inevitably leads to wreckage. It is therefore proper for him to
pay damages for injuries tortiously caused, in return for the benefits he receives from
his servant's proper conduct. The master is able to purchase liability insurance, with
the burden of the premiums passed on to the consumers. Respondeat superior also
fosters safety measures since it induces masters to exercise greater care in the selection
of servants. Id. at 141 (1964); W. SEAVEY, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior,"
in STUDIES IN AGENCY 129-59 (1949).
It might be argued that since the master is held liable for the torts of his servants,
his right to discharge should remain unrestricted. He should not be forced to retain
incompetent employees. However, the creation of a job property right would not limit
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A product of laissez-faire, employment at will evolved as a reaction to early feudal status concepts. In the Middle Ages all property
was held subject to the will of the king, and with possession came an
obligation to serve the realm. 11 There was a static social structure, in
which an individual's place was determined at birth. The legal system
rested heavily on status, tending to impose rights and duties based upon
the relationship of parties within the social structure.' 2 If an individual
neglected his service responsibilities, his property was subject to confiscation.
In the seventeenth century, with increasing social mobility, the
status system began to break down. Property was considered to be
held as a right; not subject to any limitation, or even regulation, by
the sovereign.' 3 It became identified with liberty, and could neither
be abridged nor confiscated without due process. This conception of
ownership made property one of the prime barriers to governmental
encroachments, allowing individuals to act in ways which did not
conform to societal norms. Thus the institution of property was instrumental in the development of new and sometimes unpopular ideas,
and became one of man's most basic rights. 14
An outgrowth of the industrial revolution, the concept of laissezfaire was a logical extension of the new property rights. This economic
theory promoted free competition and discouraged governmental interference. The principle of freedom of contract became the standard
governing the employment relationship. It encouraged individual initiative, allowing men to establish their own law through consent.15 The
basic premise was unlimited mobility, where there was no need to bind
either party to the employment relationship. The bargaining power
of the parties was believed to be approximately equal. It was assumed
that employees could easily find new jobs, while the employer would
have no difficulty replacing them. Under these circumstances legal
intervention was considered undesirable.
One might seriously question whether the foundations of laissezfaire theory were ever realistic. But regardless of the extent of their
the employer's freedom to dismiss on the basis of poor performance, it would only
prevent discharge for reasons which infringe on fundamental rights.
11. A. PORTER, supranote 3, at 1-2.
12. Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the
Industrial State, 55 CALIF. L. Rav. 1247, 1249 (1967).
13. A. PORTER, supra note 3, at 2-3.
14. Reich, supra note 5, at 771-72.
15. Tobriner & Grodin, supranote 12, at 1251.
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original truth, these assumptions were gradually undercut by industrial
development in the late nineteenth century. By this time businesses had
grown to such an enormous size that the relative bargaining powers
of employee and employer had become grossly unequal. Employment
opportunity had diminished as technological advances, requiring increasing specialization, limited the employee's options to move from
place to place.16 Despite this changed environment, the courts refused
to intervene in the employment relationship. The justification for continued judicial restraint was social Darwinism, a theory which applied
the principles of biological evolution to societal conditions: "survival
of the fittest" foreclosed interference with the process of "natural selection."'17 Although this approach is now generally discredited, 8 the
at will standard still prevails in master-servant law.
The employee has thus been placed in a highly vulnerable position in which his ability to earn a living is subject to the employer's
whim. He may be forced to forfeit such fundamental rights as freedom of speech in order to retain his job. The employer's power is
further enhanced by the damage created by a dismissal on a worker's
employment record. Future employment is far more difficult to obtain
once the stigma of having been fired is attached. 10
The notion of an absolute right to property, although originally
conceived of as the basis of liberty, 20 has resulted in the subjugation of
the working class. It has allowed employers to exercise dominion over
their employees, without any corresponding protection of the employee's interests. This freedom from governmental restraint has enabled employers to place unconscionable conditions on employment.
The seriousness of the situation is compounded by the importance
of employment to the individual employee. The essential elements of
his life are all dependent on his ability to derive income. 2 1 His job
is the basis of his position in society, and, therefore, may be the most
meaningful form of wealth he possesses. 22
16. Blades, supra note 10, at 1405.
17. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908) ;Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
18. See Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75: "The Fourteenth
Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."
19. Blades, supra note 10, at 1405-06.

20. See Reich, supra note 5, at 771-72.

21. Le., his ability to support a family, provide food, shelter, etc.
22. Reich, supra note 5, at 739.
To men dependent for daily existence on continuous employment, the
protection of this means of livelihood from confiscation or encroachment
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Old conceptions of property limited to the protection of interests
in land and physical objects will no longer serve as adequate protection for the individual. Abstractions like jobs must be protected if
individual liberty is to survive. Our concept of property must be expanded to encompass the employment relationship, to protect against
23
wrongful discharge.
If the individual is to survive in a collective society, he must have
protection against its ruthless pressures. There must be sanctions or
enclaves where no majority can reach. To shelter the solitary human
spirit does not merely make possible the fulfillment of individuals;
it also gives society the power to change, to grow, and to regenerate,
and hence to endure....

The challenge of the future will be to con-

struct, for the society that is coming, institutions and laws to carry on
this work. Just as the Homestead Act was a deliberate effort to foster
individual values at an earlier time, so we must try to build an economic basis for liberty today-a Homestead Act for rootless twentieth
24
century man. We must create a new property.

I. TiH

CREATION OF ABSTRACr RIGHTS

A. The Right to Privacy
The thought processes involved in the creation of new property
interests are not foreign to American jurisprudence. Perhaps this is best
exemplified by Warren and Brandeis' The Right to Privacy.25 Recognizing the inadequacies of the existing common law, the authors advocated the creation of a new right. The development of gossip columns
invaded men's personal lives, yet the traditional actions of libel and
appears as fundamental a basis of the social order as it does to the owners of
land. What both parties claim is security and continuity of livelihood-that
maintenance of the "established expectation" which is the "condition
precedent" of civilized life.
A. PORTER, supra note 3, at 80-81, quoting S. WEBB & B. WEBB, INDUSTRIAL DEMIOCRACY

566 (1914).

23. See Comment, Unemployment as a Taking Without Just Compensation, 43

L. REv. 488 (1970).
24. Reich, supra note 5, at 787. This new right need not be called "property."
A more exact definition might be the protection of the worker's interest in his employment from discharge without just cause. Yet "property" seems to be a more convenient handle, since it implies a recognition that this right is consistent with preexisting law; that it is an adaptation of the common law to modern needs.
25. 4 HARv L. REv. 193 (1890). But see Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,
171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902), where after careful consideration of the Warren and
Brandeis argument, the New York Court of Appeals rfused to recognize the right to
privacy. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
S.

CALIF.
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slander provided no relief. Warren and Brandeis argued that the injuries which these invasions of privacy created were at least as great as
those previously held actionable; and they demonstrated by analogy that
the principle behind privacy had always received legal recognition.
For them, property, viewed in its broadest sense, alone afforded
adequate protection. 26 It had come to encompass not only physical
objects, but intangibles, like thoughts and emotions. This expansion of
property protection was an indication of the common law's capacity to
adjust to the times. 27 The next interest requiring protection was that

of privacy: "the right to be left alone." 28
B. Landlord-TenantLaw
Landlord-tenant is an area where the common law is changing in
response to contemporary conditions.2 9 Under early property law,
the lease was treated as a conveyance of land, the landlord having no
duty to provide habitable premises. This was a reasonable response to
the conditions of a rural agrarian society, where an interest in land was
actually transferred to the tenant. However, such a response has little
application to modem urban dwellings, in which the tenant only desires a place to live and has little concern for the land on which the
building stands. The city dweller in seeking shelter desires "a wellknown package of goods and services,"' 0 which includes more than just
walls and ceilings. 31 In order to reach results more in consonance with
26. 4 HAv. L.Rnv. 193, 211 (1890).
27. Id. at 193.
28. Id. at 195.
29. Another example of the creation of new rights has been in the area of
automobile franchise agreements. Originally governed by the principles of traditional
contract law, there was no provision for judicial intervention. The parties were allowed
to negotiate their own agreements, resulting in an at will relationship similar to that
which exists in employment. Ultimately, through a recognition of the existence of
unequal bargaining power, the dealers were afforded protection by Congress. See the
Federal Automobile Franchise Act of 1956, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1971); Blades,
supra note 10 at 1415; Gellhorn, Limitation on Contract Termination RightsFranchise Cancellations, 1967 DuxE L.J. 465; Macauley, Changing a Continuing
Relationship Between a Large Corporation and Those Who Deal With It: Automobile
Manufacturers, Their Dealers, and the Legal System (pts. I & II), 1965 Wis. L. REV.
483, 740.
30. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
31. When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek "shelter" today,
they seek a well known package of goods and services-a package which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation and proper maintenance.
Id.
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these changed conditions and recognizing the inequality of bargaining power and the scarcity of urban housing, judges have borrowed
notions from modem contract law3 2 and have implied a warranty of
habitability. 38 Thus, upon finding the conditions which gave rise to the
existing landlord-tenant law to be no longer present, the courts used
related legal principles to adapt to the altered circumstances.
C. New PropertyRights Created in the Government Largesse
The last decade has witnessed the development of individual rights
to government largesse. The courts have recognized the existence of
new forms of wealth which require legal protection. They have moved
away from the notion that these benefits are mere gratuities and have
established them as the property of the individual recipient.
The unfavorable result reached in Flemming v. Nestore4 was the
prelude to this development. There the Supreme Court held that there
was no property right to social security benefits, believing that the
grant of such a right would deprive the social security system of the
flexibility and boldness needed to adjust to ever-changing conditions.
However, the majority did not try to fit the benefits within ancient
property concepts, but instead attempted to balance the advantages
and detriments that would accrue to society through a recognition of
these rights. The Court thus identified property as "a means of arranging rights between people to attain social goals. 835
This balancing process was later used as a means of developing
new rights. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 36 a case involving the termination of

welfare payments without a hearing, the Court balanced the individual's "overpowering need" against the concern for protecting public funds. It found that "the interest of the eligible recipient in uninterrupted receipt of public assistance coupled with the State's interest that his payments not be erroneously terminated, clearly outweigh[ed] the State's competing concern to prevent any increase in its

fiscal and administrative burdens."8 7
32. Id. at 1075.
33. For another example of judicial implication of warranties based on an
inequality of bargaining power see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960) (the automobile consumer case).
34. 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
35. Comment, supra note 23, at 493.
36. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
37. Id. at 266.
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Thus, there has evolved judicial recognition that all citizens are
entitled "to a minimal share of the commonwealth." '8 The courts have
created abstract property rights to the benefits dispensed by the government in modem society.
II.

CRACKS IN THE JUDICIAL ARMOR

The courts have not been completely uniform in their acceptance
of the at will doctrine. In a few extreme cases the courts have recogized some form of job right. In Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396,81
plaintiff had been fired for refusing to commit perjury at his employer's
direction. A California court upheld a suit for wrongful discharge,
awarding plaintiff his accrued salary as damages. While recognizing the
general rule that employment of unspecified duration is terminable at
will, the court carved an exception where the discharge is contrary
to public policy.
Coats v. General Motors Corp.4o involved a suit by a corporate
executive to recover the value of shares of stock, which constituted
compensation in addition to his regular salary. Plaintiff's employment
was to continue for as long as his services proved satisfactory. The
employer based its denial of payment on a dismissal for unsatisfactory
performance. The court refused to question the reasonableness of the
employer's decision, but stated that the discharge must be based on a
good faith assessment of the quality of the employee's services. Thus,
the employer's discretion was limited to matters within the scope of
employment.
Sinnett v. Hie Food Products, Inc.4 1 and Kollman v. McGregor42
both involved suits by employees to recover bonuses for continuous
services. The courts recognized that contracts for an indefinite term
were terminable at will, yet they upheld the employee's recovery when
the dismissal was without good cause. 43 Thus they declined to apply
38. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues,
74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969);
Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970) (tenants
entitled to due process upon eviction from public housing); Belcher v. Richardson, 317
F. Supp. 1294 (S.D.W. Va. 1970) (right to social security payments).

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (2d Dist. 1959).
3 Cal. App. 2d 340, 39 P.2d 838 (lst Dist. 1934).
185 Neb. 221, 174 N.W.2d 720 (1970).
240 Iowa 1331, 39 N.W.2d 302 (1949).
"The contract of employment, not being for a definite term, was terminable
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the at will doctrine when it would contravene established notions of
fairness.
Only rarely has the question of whether there is a property right in
employment been presented to the courts. However, in a 1910 case
where a former employer was interfering with plaintiff's ability to obtain a new job, the Supreme Court of Washington indicated that they
44
accepted the existence of such a right:
It would be well to remember in the beginning that it is fundamental that a man has a right to be protected in his property. This
was the doctrine of the common law, is, and always has been, the law
in every civilized nation. It is of necessity one of the fundamental
principles of government, the protection of property being largely one
of the objects of government. For the protection of life, liberty, and
property, men have yielded up their natural rights and established governments. Is, then, the right of employment in a laboring man property? That it is we think cannot be questioned. The property of the
capitalist is his gold and silver, his bonds, credit, etc., for in these he
deals, and makes his living. For the same reason, the property of the
merchant is his good. And every man's trade or profession is his property, because, through its agency, he maintains himself and his family,
and is enabled to add his share towards the expenses of maintaining
the government. Can it be said with any degree of sense or justice that
the property which a man has in his labor which is the foundation of
all property and which is the only capital of so large a majority of the
citizens of our country is not property; or, at least, not that character
of property which can 4demand
the boon of protection from the gov5
ernment? We think not.
Although holding that there was no employment property right,
the recent decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Charland
v. Norge Division, Borg-Warner Corp. 46 has cleared the way for future
protection. Having worked at Norge for thirty years, plaintiff was

given the alternative of moving with his employer to a city hundreds
of miles away and losing his accumulated seniority and pension rights,
or signing a complete release of all job rights for $1,500. He argued
that this constituted a deprivation of property without due process of
law.
The detailed description of the worker's injury contained in the
at will by either party, but this does not deprive plaintiff of the right to recover when
discharged without good cause." 185 Neb. at 223, 174 N.W.2d at 722.
44. Jones v. Leslie, 61 Wash. 107, 112 P. 81 (1910).
45. Id. at 110, 112 P. at 82.
46. 407 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 927 (1969).
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opinion emphasized the harm which the common law rule legitimatizes.
Although sympathetic to the plaintiff's case, the court felt bound by
precedent and extended an invitation to the Supreme Court to change
the existing rule.
Article V of the Constitution, of course, makes no mention of
employment. But it (and the Fourteenth Amendment) does prohibit
deprivation of property without due process of law. Thus appellant's
assumption submits the fundamental question of whether or not
there is a legally recognizable property right in a job which has been
held for something approaching a lifetime.
Whatever the future may bring, neither by statute nor by court
decision has appellant's claimed property right been recognized to date
in this country . .. Needless to say, if the United States Supreme
Court wishes now to reconsider
and expand [its] view of senority ...
47
this case offers a vehicle.

Although these cases represent only a tiny crack in the solid wall
of decisions holding that employment is at will, they indicate that
courts might be receptive, where rights are clearly infringed, to arguments for the protection of the worker's interests.
III.

THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE

Various statutory provisions, both state and federal, recognize the
interest of workers in their jobs, and attempt to limit the scope of
employers' control. While not changing the common law rule, these
statutes demonstrate a legislative awareness of the problem.
A. The State Level
Few state statutes are designed to bar employers' attempts to control the political activity of their workers. 4 For various reasons these
have had little effect on the employment relationship. Most are criminal provisions, with no specific redress for the injured employee.
Complaints against violators of these laws are extremely rare, since
employees who bring such complaints risk losing their jobs.40
47. Id. at 1065.
48. Only five states have statutes which are clear attempts to deal with the
problem. Note, California's Controls on Employer Abuse of Employee Political Rights,
22 STAN. L. REv. 1015, 1019 (1970). See CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1101-05 (West 1955);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 80-11-8 (1963); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-813 (1964); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 23:961-62 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.040 (1967).

49. Blades, supranote 10, at 1412.
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The general attitude of the state courts has not been friendly to
such statutes.50 For example, in Bell v. Faulkner5' a Missouri court
drastically reduced the effectiveness of a statute prohibiting interference
by the employer with the employee's right to vote. 52 While approving
the statute's purpose, the court held that it was purely criminal, and
did not allow for civil remedies.
The treatment of the California statutes 53 is particularly instructive when considering judicial limitations upon statutory scope. The
court in Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court54 upheld discharges
from a plant manufacturing airplanes for the federal government.
Employers who fired workers advocating the overthrow of the government by force were exempted from the statutory prohibition against
discharge for political activity. The court allowed an employer engaged
in the production of vital war materials to dismiss those whose loyalty
had not been established to his satisfaction. Notwithstanding the importance of security in the operation of an armaments plant, the court
should not have permitted this factor to override the policy of the
statute. The decision again placed termination entirely within the
employer's discretion, making his judgments virtually unreviewable.
By narrowly defining "political activity" so as to exclude revolution,
the court destroyed the statutory protection of unpopular minority
viewpoints. In being overly protective of the employer's interests, the
court undermined the employee's rights under the statute. 55
Although these state statutes have not as yet provided effective
protection, they may possibly do so in the future. 5 An analogy might
be drawn to landlord-tenant law, where housing codes have been a
50. Comment, Loyalty and Private Employment: The Right of Employers to Discharge Suspected Subversives, 62 YALE L.J. 954, 962 (1953).
51. 75 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. App. 1934).
52. Mo. STAT. ANN. § 10479 (1929).
53. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1101-05 (West 1955).
54. 28 Cal.2d 481, 171 P.2d 21 (1946). The relevant section reads as follows:
No employer shall make, adopt, or enforce any rule, regulation, or policy: (a)
Forbidding or preventing employees from engaging or participating in politics
or from becoming candidates for public office. (b) Controlling or directing, or
tending to control or direct the political activities or affiliations of employees.
CAL. LABOR CODE § 1101 (West 19).
55. Further limitations were placed on the California statute in Mallard v.
Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (4th Dist. 1960), where it was held
that "political activity" does not encompass the right of employees to perform jury
duty.
56. For an interesting and provocative study on the California legislation's potential for the development of employee rights, see Note, CdTifornia's Controls on Employcr Abuse of Employee PoliticalRights, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1015 (1970).
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vehicle for judicial imposition of an affirmative duty on the landlord
to provide habitable premises.5 7 The decision in Edwards v. Habib 6
has an even closer application to employment. On the basis of public
policy, the Habib court held that "while [a] landlord may evict for any
legal reason, or for no reason at all, he is not ... free to evict in retaliation for his tenant's report of housing code violations to the
authorities."5 9 To permit such evictions would frustrate the purpose of
the codes. 60 Thus, courts have expanded the remedies in order to enhance the statute's effectiveness. Similar treatment might be attempted
in the employment area to provide some form of protection.
B. The FederalLevel
In a variety of forms, Congress has recognized the employee's
interest as being worthy of protection. The clearest attempt to regulate
the employment relationship was the National Labor Relations Act, 61
which protects employees' rights to organize and engage in collective
bargaining. The scope of this protection is limited, however, to those
engaged in union activity.6 2 That this did not fundamentally change
the nature of employment is clear from the Supreme Court's opinion
in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,03 which stated:
The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of the right
of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them. The employer may not, under cover of that right, intimidate, coerce its
employees with respect to their self-organization and representation,
and, on the other hand, the Board is not entitled to make its authority a pretext for interference with the right of discharge when that
right is exercised for other reasons than such intimidation and
coercion.64

57. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Amanuensis,
Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971).
58. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
59. Id. at 699.

60. Id. at 700-01.

61. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970).

62. But while unions have done much to correct the imbalance between employers and employees, the assumption that they stand as the universal protectors of all employees at every echelon of employment would be an obvious
and gross exaggeration. Less than a quarter of the American working population is now covered by collective bargaining agreements.
Blades, supra note 10, at 1410.

63. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
64. Id. at 45-46.
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An implication of congressional concern can also be derived from
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.65 The Act outlaws discharges based on racial
or other forms of discrimination by employers who are engaged in interstate commerce and have the statutory minimum number of employees. The presence of these provisions demonstrates an appreciation
of the need for government regulation of private employment.
The Supreme Court was initially hostile to federal economic regulation, 6 including statutes dealing with employment. In Adair v.
United States67 and Coppage v. Kansas68 the Court struck down statutes
directed against "yellow dog" contracts. These prohibited employers
from requiring that, as a condition of employment, workers agree not
to join unions. The Court held that such laws were an unconstitutional
interference with the freedom of contract. While individuals have the
right to join a union, this does not deprive employers of their right
to not hire union men.6 The Court noted the inequality of bargaining power, but considered it to be irrelevant to their decision.70
As the necessity of government regulation became clear and the
composition of the Court was altered, a "hands-off" approach was
adopted; economic regulation was now considered to be a valid exer72
cise of the police power.71 In NLPB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
the Court upheld the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively, recognizing that unequal bargaining power compelled government intervention. 3
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970).
66. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

67. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
68. 236 U.S. 1(1915).
69. Id. at 19.
70. No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there must and
will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by circumstances. This
applies to all contracts, and not merely to that between employer and
employ6.... [S]ince it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in common,
some persons must have more property than others, it is from the nature of
things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private property
without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune
that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights.
Id. at 17.
71. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).

72. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
73. [T]he right of employees to self-organization and to select representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining or other mutual
protection without restraint or coercion by their employer . . . is a fundamental right. Employees have as clear a right to organize and select their
representatives for lawful purposes as the respondent has to organize its busi-
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Thus, in considering the legitimacy of federal legislation, the Court
has abandoned laissez-faire concepts of freedom of contract. Yet when
there is no applicable statute and no union activity is involved, the
courts feel bound by outdated rules of law. Judges should raise their
sophistication in the employment area to the level achieved elsewhere,
and recognize the fundamental interest of workers in their jobs. They
should not let such a basic question of legal rights be determined by
whether or not the individual is a union member.
IV.

THE RIGHT TO PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT

Courts originally held that public employment was a privilege,
not a right, and, therefore, not subject to the requirement of due
process. Support for this proposition was derived from Holmes' opinion
in McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 4 where he stated that "the petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman."' 5 This reasoning allowed the
state to impose on government jobs conditions which infringed upon
the employee's basic freedoms.76
In the last few decades the courts have gradually eliminated the
right-privilege distinction and increased the protection given to government employees.77 This trend reflects a judicial recognition of the
ness and select its own officers and agents. Discrimination and coercion to
prevent the free exercise of the right of employees to self-organization and
representation is a proper subject for condemnation by competent legislative authority. Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. We

said that they were organized out of the necessities of the situation; that a
single employee was helpless in dealing with an employer; that he was dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of himself and
family; that if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair,
he was nevertheless unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair
treatment; that union was essential to give laborers opportunity to deal on
an equality with their employer.
Id. at 33.
74. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
75. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 517.
76. Similar reasoning was applied by the Court in United States ex rel. Knauff
v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950), where admission to this country was held to be
a privilege, not a right.
77. In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971), the Supreme Court
"rejected the concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a government benefit
is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege." See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) (involving unemployment benefits); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the RightPrivilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. Rnv. 1439 (1968); Comment,
Constitutional Rights of Public Employees: Progress Toward Protection, 49 N.C.L. REv.
302 (1971).
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competing values which must be weighed. As in other constitutional
areas, the courts will consider not only the extent of the public interest
behind the governmental action, but also the private right involved and
the degree of injury to the individual government employee. The distinction between rights and privileges has faded as legal requirements
have been increasingly imposed on the dispensation of benefits. This is
partly based on a feeling that, regardless of the capacity in which it
acts, the Government must still be held to a standard of fairness. 78 But
the courts are also recognizing new rights to public employment which
require legal protection.
A. Examples of Judicial Treatment of Government Employment:
The Security Cases
The trend towards the expansion of individual rights may be illustrated by the cases in which public employees were discharged for
9 decided in 1950,
security reasons. Bailey v. Richardson,"
involved a
refusal to reinstate a public employee accused of disloyalty. The plaintiff was given a hearing, but was denied confrontation with the witnesses against her, and was not informed of the method by which
her alleged disloyalty was detected. The court held that, regardless of
the extent of the injury, a public employee was not entitled to due
process upon discharge. Obviously influenced by the tenor of the times,
the ruling rested on a belief that government employment was a
privilege and not a right.8 0
In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,s1 a number
of Justices indicated their displeasure with the Bailey decision.
McGrath involved an executive order which empowered the Attorney
General to declare certain organizations subversive. Association with
such an organization by a government employee would constitute
evidence of disloyalty. The Justices concluded that since these associational determinations would have a substantial effect, notice and a
hearing were required.
In Greene v. McElroy8 2 and Cafeteria Workers Union, Local 473,
78. K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 7.12, at 176-78 (3d ed. 1972).
79. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
80. The opinion was ably criticized in a dissent by Judge Edgerton who stated
that "the premise that government employment is a privilege does not support the
conclusion that it may be granted on condition that certain economic or political ideas
not be entertained." Id. at 72.
81. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
82. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
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AFL-CIO v. McElroy8 3 the Court elaborated on the factors relevant to

their decisions in government employee cases. In Greene an aeronautical engineer was deprived of his security clearance because of alleged communist sympathies. Although the Court's decision was based
on whether the action was authorized by Congress or the President,
it was recognized that "the right to hold specific private employment
and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental
interference comes within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of the
Fifth Amendment... "284
The extent of this right was further delineated in the Cafeteria
Workers 5 case. Petitioner was denied access to her job at a naval gun
factory because she allegedly failed to meet the security requirements.
The Court upheld the action, distinguishing this case from Greene on
the basis of the unspecialized nature of this employment. She was not
denied the right to follow her chosen professsion, but was only prohibited from working at one particular job. Furthermore, her discharge carried none of the stigma of disloyalty, and, therefore, would
not prevent her from obtaining future employment. It was held that
the government does not have the complete freedom of action that is
had by the private employer, and cannot discharge for an arbitrary or
bad reason; but this does not mean that notice and hearing are required
in every case.
The dissent claimed that due process had been violated by the
denial of a hearing. It argued that the Court's decision removed the
procedural safeguards against arbitrary official action, allowing the
government to act unlawfully under the cover of security requirements.
A further criticism of the majority opinion might be articulated as
follows: any discharge, particularly one based on a "security risk," impinges upon the employee's ability to secure future employment. Thus,
the distinction made by the majority between professional and nonprofessional employees would not be relevant in determining the extent
of the injury. A more significant factor, which was not considered by
the Court, is the degree to which security considerations relate to the
particular position. The private interest should be paramount in nonsensitive areas.8 6
83. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
84. 360 U.S. at 492.
85. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
86. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956). See also Parker v. Lester, 112, F. Supp.
433, 443 (N.D. Cal. 1953): "I define due process in terms of the maximum procedural
safeguards which can be afforded petitioners without jeopardizing the security program."
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Thus, in considering security related government employee cases,
the courts have balanced the public interest against the private right in
each particular case. In making this determination the court considers
the degree of specialization in the particular job (i.e., will the individual be able to get another position like it), the stigma attached to
dismissal, and the sensitivity of the particular position. Thus, legal
limitations have been placed on the government's freedom to operate.
Obviously there are countervailing pressures in the area of private employment; yet many of the same problems abound and should be subject to some form of outside control.
B. The Teacher Cases
The protections of the Bill of Rights are of special importance to
teachers.8 7 Our nation is strongly committed to the principle of academic freedom, and will not tolerate laws which impinge on the
school's capacity to be a "marketplace for ideas. ' 88 The courts will not
allow the state to place conditions on employment which violate a
teacher's fundamental rights.8 9 Development in this area has thus
coincided with public employment generally, with increasingly strong
restrictions placed on the state's power to discharge.
The recent Supreme Court decisions in Perry v. Sindermann ° and
Board of Regents v. Roth91 threaten to drastically undermine the cause
of teacher's rights. The Court held that in the absence of tenure, procedural due process prior to dismissal is only required in a limited class of
cases. While claiming not to deny the substantive rights of teachers,
the Court nevertheless removed the procedural safeguards.
Sindermann involved a teacher with ten years' experience in the
Texas college system. He had been employed at Odessa Junior College
for four successive years, under a series of one-year contracts. Because
87. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
196-97 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Pred v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 415

F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969).
88. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
89. "We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the
public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or discriminatory." Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. at 192. See also Connell v. Higginbotham,
403 U.S. 207 (1971); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Slochower
v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d
Cir. 1947); Albaum v. Carey, 283 F. Supp. 3 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
90. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
91. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
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of a controversy with the Board of Regents, his contract was not renewed, and the Regents issued a press release containing allegations
of insubordination. Sindermann received neither an official statement of
the reasons for nonrenewal nor an opportunity for a hearing. His complaint alleged that this denial violated procedural due process. He
further argued that the nonrenewal was based on his criticism of the
administration's policies, and thereby infringed upon his right of
freedom of speech.
The Court's opinion in Sindermann begins by reaffirming the principle that the government may not deny a benefit on a basis that interferes with constitutionally protected interests. This rule applies regardless of whether the individual has a "right" to receive the benefits.
Thus, the question of whether the teacher had a "right" to reemployment is irrelevant to his free speech claim.
The second half of the opinion is a discussion of whether the
guarantees of procedural due process are applicable. Asserting that no
hearing is required unless there has been a deprivation of "liberty"
or "property," the Court held that there had been such a deprivation
in this case. The reason given was that there existed a de facto tenure
policy, which created an expectancy of continued employment, and
thus supported the teacher's claim of entitlement. The absence of an
explicit contractual provision did not preclude the possibility of a
property interest in reemployment.
Roth involved a teacher who was not rehired after completing the
full term of his first one-year contract. He had no tenure rights to continued employment, since these only attached after four years. Under
state law the decision to rehire was left to the discretion of university
officials. A teacher was entitled to a hearing if discharged during the
term of his contract, but no such protection was afforded for nonrenewal. Roth's claim was similar to Sindermann's: that his rights under
the first and fourteenth amendments were violated. The Court rested
its decision on procedural due process alone.
The Roth Court reiterated the proposition that unless an interest
in "liberty" or "property" was at stake a hearing was not required. The
majority refused to apply the balancing test of whether the teacher's
interest in reemployment outweighed the university's interest in denying it summarily. The Court concluded that the decision not to reemploy Roth did not deprive him of his liberty, because no charges
were made which would seriously damage his standing in the com-
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munity. Nor did the dismissal attach a stigma which would interfere
with his ability to take advantage of other employment opportunities.
In order for a property right to have attached to Roth's job, he must
have had a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Such claim would be
created and defined, not by the Constitution, but by the terms of his
appointment.9 2 Since Roth's employment was to terminate after one
year, with no provision for renewal, he had an "abstract concern" in
being rehired, but not a property interest in his employment. 93
It is critical to note that the Roth opinion does not dispute the
individual's right not to be arbitrarily treated by the government.
However, it effectively deprives nontenured teachers of their procedural protections. Now the constitutionally impermissible reasons behind some dismissals will not be uncovered by the hearing process. The
effect of this denial of procedural due process will be an abridgement of substantive rights. The Court bases its crucial decision on when
to grant procedural due process on arbitrary distinctions. Its method
of determining when a property interest is at stake rests more on form
than on substance. The majority's offhand denial that Roth was stigmatized by the dismissal reflects a failure to consider the serious consequences that could follow from nonretention. A more just approach
would have been to balance the extent of the injury to the teacher
against the public interest in the orderly administration of the school
system. The Roth decision would then have been based on substantial
issues, rather than formal distinctions."
V.

LICENSE REvOCATION

The right to earn a living in the common occupations of the community is a fundamental right, guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.9 5 Development of legal protection in the licensing area has paralleled that of the other portions of the government largesse. Courts
formerly treated licenses as privileges which could be denied without
notice or a hearing. Presently though, in the absence of a countervailing necessity, a hearing is required when important interests are at
92. This reactionary approach may herald a return to the freedom of contract
notions underlying laissez-faire.
93. 408 U.S. at 578.
94. For a recent case applying Roth and Sindermann see Johnson v. Fraley, 470
F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1972).
95. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
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stake. 0 An individual is allowed to argue the facts of his particular
case to enable the administrator to make a fair determination.97 Due
process must be accorded when denying individuals the right to practice their profession. A person's interest in pursuing his occupation
has been held to be as valuable as other forms of property, 98 and cannot be arbitrarily abridged.99
VI.

PRIVATE ASSOCIATIONS

The discussion thus far has centered on individual rights in relation to the government; but private groups have not been immune
from judicial control. Courts originally maintained a "hands-off" policy towards private associations, and then gradually, albeit with some
reluctance, placed legal controls on their activities.
Private associations perform a variety of beneficial functions in
our society'0 0 which courts have felt could best be served by keeping
the groups informal and free from judicial scrutiny. The argument was
that since such groups were based on personal relationships, they should
not be forced to take on unwanted members; these social clubs should
be allowed self-government, with anyone dissatisfied being free to leave.
AS private organizations have become larger and more powerful,
there has been a corresponding weakening of the traditional controls
by the members and a recognition of the necessity of judicial intervention.101 In determining whether a question is judicially cognizable, several factors must be taken into consideration. 02 Harm to the individual must be weighed against the interest in preserving the associa96. 1 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 144 (1965).
97. K. DAVIS, supra note 78, § 7.16.

98. Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889).
99. See, e.g., Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Schware v.
Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957); Goldsmith v. United States Bd. of
Tax Appeal, 270 U.S. 117 (1926); Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir.
1966); Endler v. Schutzbank, 68 Cal. 2d 162, 436 P.2d 297, 65 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1968);
Stewart v. San Mateo County, 246 Cal. App. 2d 273, 54 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1st Dist.
1966); Fascination, Inc. v. Hoover, 39 Cal. 2d 260, 246 P.2d 656 (1952). Contra, Cohen
v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961); Konigsberg v.
State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
100. Developments in the Law, Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARv. L. REV. 983, 987-89 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the
Law].
101. Id. at 989. See also Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 361-67
(1963).
102. Developments in the Law, supra note 100, at 990.
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tion's autonomy. 10 3 The closer the group comes to maintaining a
monopolistic control over a vital interest, the more likely it is that
the courts will intervene. 0 4 Courts will almost always assume jurisdiction to protect a property interest, even though this may necessitate involvement in an internal organizational dispute. 10 5
The courts will assert jurisdiction when the acts of the private
organization deprive the individual of the right to pursue his occupation. In Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Society' 0 6 a doctor
was refused membership in a medical society, with a resulting loss of
access to local hospital facilities.
The court cited public policy as the dominant factor in molding
common law principles to the high end of serving public welfare and
justice. 0 7 The opinion recognized that when there is a conflict with
a public policy, the courts must overcome their reluctance to intervene
in private affairs, and invalidate the association's action. 0 8 Acting on
these principles, the court struck down the "arbitrary" action of the
Medical Society in denying membership to a qualified physician. The
court held that upon becoming a virtual monopoly, the private organization is required to observe due process. The extent of its power makes
it no longer a private, informal, voluntary group, based on intimate
personal relationships. Membership becomes an economic necessity,
and the courts must safeguard the individual's right to earn a living.
The association's power should not be left unbridled, but should be
exercised in a reasonable manner for the advancement of the public
interest.
The Falcone approach was extended in other casesA0 9 where admission to professional societies was not an economic necessity, but was
essential to achieving occupational recognition. These organizations had
acquired a quasi-public significance, in that membership was considered
to be a demonstration of professional competence, responsibility and
acceptance. Therefore, the associations were required to observe due
process, even though dismissal would not prohibit the individual from
practicing.
103. Id. at 1058-59.
104. Id. at 993-94.
105. Id. at 998.

106. 34N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961).
107. Id. at 589, 170 A.2d at 795.
108. Id. at 590, 170 A.2d at 796.
109. McCune v. Wilson, 237 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1970) ; Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soe'y
of Orthodontists, 1 Cal. 3d 160, 460 P.2d 495, 81 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1969).
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Legal controls have also been placed on the internal operations of
unions. At first they too were considered to be private voluntary associations;11 0 but as their power increased, so did the amount of judicial intervention.:'1
Carroll v. Local 269112 involved a denial of union membership.
The court declared that the right to earn a living was a property right
guaranteed by both the state and federal constitutions. Although a
monopoly on iabor opportunity is a permissible union objective, once
such power is obtained it must be exercised democratically, with all
qualified individuals admitted to membership.
A similar approach was taken by a California court in James v.
Marinship Corp.," 3 where the union refused to admit blacks as members. The court felt that by having a closed shop, the union occupied
a quasi-public position. Thus, it could no longer pursue policies, such
as discrimination, which are contrary to the public interest. In yet
another labor case, 11 4 a worker sought reinstatement in his union
after expulsion as a result of his campaign for a "right-to-work" law in
contravention of official union policy. Balancing the union's interest in
self-governance with the member's freedom of expression, the court
held that where political activities are not patently in conflict with the
union's best interests, the union may not use its power to curb the
right of the individual member to advocate a political position. It was
held to be no answer to say that the member has freedom of speech,
but no right to belong to a union.
The controls placed on private associations differ only in degree
from those placed on the government itself. Constitutional liberties
cannot be lawfully infringed by individuals, any more than by the
state; nor can they be abridged by corporations or unincorporated
associations." 5 The same reasoning applies to the private employment
relationship where judicial scrutiny is also needed. The interests at
stake are almost identical, since both involve interferences with the
110. See Frank v. National Alliance of Bill Posters, 89 N.J.L. 380, 99 A. 134
(1916); Mayer v. Journeyman Stone-cutter's Ass'n, 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 20 A. 492 (ch.
1890).
111. See Betts v. Easley, 161 Kan. 459, 169 P.2d 831 (1946); Heasley v. Operative
:Plasterers Local 31, 324 Pa. 257, 188 A. 206 (1936).
112. 133 N.J. Eq. 144, 31 A.2d 223 (ch. 1943).
113. 25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P.2d 329 (1945).
114. Mitchell v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 16
Gal. Rptr. 813 (2d Dist. 1961).
115. Cf. Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge No. 665, 270 Pa. 67, 113 A. 70 (1921).
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individual's ability to earn a living. There is no sufficiently significant
distinction between the areas to justify the vastly different treatment
given them by the courts. 116
VII. STATE ACTION
The requirements of the Constitution are only applicable when
there is some form of state action. 117 However, it has become increasingly apparent that fundamental rights are endangered not only by
the government, but also by powerful private parties. Accordingly, the
concept of state action has been expanded to encompass private groups
whose power is, in some sense, derived from the government.
Although there may be no formal delegation of governmental
authority by the state, the identification between the private and the
public entities may be great enough to constitute state action."' Examples of this reasoning are present in Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority'" and Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak. 20 State action was found in Burton where a restaurant leasing space in a publicly
owned and operated automobile parking building refused to serve
blacks. In Pollak, the finding of state action was based on the regulatory supervision of a street railway company by a federal commission.
After investigating the issue in dispute, the agency had approved the
company's action.
This basis for applying state action was recently undercut by the
Supreme Court in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.121 The Court held
that there was no violation of the fourteenth amendment when a private social club refused to sell to blacks. The Court distinguished this
case from Burton on the basis that the latter involved "a public restaurant in a public building, [while] Moose Lodge [was] a private social
122
club in a private building."'
It was argued in Moose Lodge that the granting of a state liquor
license constituted sufficient state action. But the Court answered
116. Developments in the Law, supra note 100, at 1009-10.

117. Id. at 1058. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-19 (1883) where the
Court required state action for Congress to legislate equal treatment under the
fourteenth amendment. But see Jones v. Albert H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
118. Developments in the Law, supranote 100, at 1067-68.

119.
120.
121.
122.

365 U.S. 715 (1961).
343 U.S. 451 (1952).
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
Id. at 175.
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that unlike Pollak, the agency had not approved the racially discriminatory practices of the Moose Lodge. The Court held that the mere existence of a state liquor regulatory scheme was not sufficient to constitute
state action. This result was reached despite the fact, pointed out by
the dissent, that the number of licenses issued was strictly limited.
By distinguishing this case from Pollak and Burton, the Court
obviously limits the effect of these latter opinions. This reflects a reluctance to impose constitutional restraints on private action. Yet
this attitude may be limited to the circumstances of this case. Courts
have always been hesitant to interfere with the internal policies of
private social groups. Perhaps in a different situation with a larger
group, exercising great power over the individual members, and having a closer connection with the state, the Court might intervene.
The Court has also imposed constitutional limitation on private
entities which exercise essentially governmental functions at the suffer124
ance of the state. 2 3 The leading case in this area is Marsh v. Alabama,
where a Jehovah's Witness was prohibited from distributing religious
literature in a company town. The Court held that the right to freedom of expression overrode the owner's property interests; the state
cannot permit a corporation to govern a community so as to restrict
the fundamental liberties of its citizens.
The holding in Marsh was extended in Food Employees Local 590
v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 51 which involved labor picketing in a
private shopping center. The ownership of the Logan Valley Mall obtained a state court injunction against the picketing, as being a trespass
on private property. The Supreme Court held that the state cannot use
its trespass laws to abridge first amendment rights.
However, this line of decisions, expanding state action, was recently
limited by the Court in Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB 12 and Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner.27 Central Hardware involved a prohibition of
union solicitations in an employer's parking lot, open to the public.
The Court refused to apply Marsh to this situation for fear of opening
the door to unwarranted infringements on private property rights.
Before subjecting an owner to constitutional restrictions, the private
"property must assume to some significant degree the functional at123.
124.
125.
126.

Developments in the Law,,supra note 100, at 1068.
326 U.S. 501 (1946).
391 U.S. 308 (1968).
407 U.S. 539 (1972).

127. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
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tributes of public property devoted to public use.' 1
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open to the public is not enough. While upholding Marsh, the Court
wished to give priority to the countervailing property rights. The decision in Tanner was founded upon similar principles. In that case the
owners of a private shopping center refused to allow any handbills to
be distributed on the premises. Vietnam war protesters were threatened
with arrest for trespass unless they refrained from leafletting within
the mall. The prohibition on the dissemination of protest literature
was upheld by the Court since handbilling was found to have no
relation to any purpose for which the mall was built or used. Distribution could have proceeded with equal effectiveness in any public
area. Therefore, "[i]t would be an unwarranted infringement of property rights to require them to yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under circumstances where adequate alternative avenues
of communication exist. Such an accommodation would diminish property rights without significantly enhancing the asserted right of free
speech.'

29

Another basis for the application of constitutional restrictions to
private activity was highlighted by Shelley v. Kraemer.'3 0 The Court
found that, when voluntarily complied with, racially restrictive covenants on housing did not violate equal protection. Honoring such restrictions would merely be adherence to a private contract, and therefore would not involve state action. However, judicial enforcement of
the covenant, through application of the common law rules, is unconstitutional.
This expansion of state action has been applied by courts to other
cases dealing with different situations. Among them is Edwards v.
Habib,1 3' an action for wrongful eviction. The tenant argued that
eviction for reporting housing code violations was an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech. The issue was whether there
was any form of state action in the eviction. The court stated that the
application by the judiciary of the state's common law, even in a
private lawsuit, may constitute state action, and, therefore, must conform to constitutional requirements. Thus, it may be unconstitutional
for a court to uphold the landlord's retaliatory eviction.
128.
129.
130.
131.

407
407
334
397

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
F.2d

at 547.
at 567.
1 (1948).
687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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These decisions might be applied to employment relations to create
constitutional job protection. The argument would be that it is unconstitutional for a court to uphold a discharge which violated the
employee's fundamental rights. This would outlaw application of the
traditional master-servant at will rule in cases of employer abuse.
A similar argument was attempted in Elders v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 32 where the plaintiff's public stand on an issue
before the legislature was unpopular with his employer. Basing his
complaint on the Civil Rights Act, 1 33 the plaintiff alleged that he had
been harassed, persecuted and finally discharged by his employer. He
invoked the common law of the state and the state statute governing
labor relations to tinge defendant corporation's actions with the color
of state law. The plaintiff argued that the law and the statutes, by defining and delimiting the employment relationship, vested the defendants with actual authority of the state. However, the court held
that defendants acted merely as a private corporation, unrelated to the
state. A fear was expressed that "[a]n application of plaintiff's theory
would render the concept of state action a hollow and superfluous element as any civil action which had some precedent in the law of the
state could be described as done under color of law.' 134 Therefore,
defendant's acts, even if wrongful, were not compelled by state law.
The court held that there is no constitutional job protection. Thus, an
employee may be discharged for the exercise of his right of free ex-pression.
A final theoretical basis for attaching constitutional restraints on
the private employer has been to consider corporations as private governments, which should be subject to the same limitations as the state
itself. 35 The framers of the Constitution perceived the government as
the only threat to individual liberty." 6 However, the growth of private
economic units wielding great power may endanger the very freedom
which the founding fathers sought to protect. The factors to be considered in triggering the application of this doctrine are the relation132. 289 F. Supp. 630 (D. Minn. 1968).
133. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985.
134. 289 F. Supp. at 634.
135. "The emerging principle appears to be that the corporation, itself a creation
of the state, is as subject to constitutional limitations which limit action as is the state
itself." Berle, Constitutional Limitation on Corporate Activity-Protection of Personal
Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 942 (1952).
See also Friedmann, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the LaW, 57
CoLuM. L. REv. 155 (1957).
136. Note, supra note 56, at 1018-19.
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ship between the corporation and the state, and the degree to which
its economic power is capable of invading individual rights. 37 Therefore, the existence of power to cause harm, derived from the state
corporate charter, coupled with an invasion of individual rights, may
justify the application of constitutional restrictions. 138
These theories provide no clear guidelines as to when private
activity becomes state action. It is difficult to determine when there
is sufficient identification with the state, or what activities are "essentially governmental."' 3 9 The line so drawn might turn out to be arbitrary, with no rational justification for imposing constitutional limitations on some groups and not on others. While certain private entities
would be under strict regulation, others might operate without restraint. The logic of imposing constitutional requirements on large
corporations would have little application to small businesses which
do not wield great overall power, and can hardly be said to operate as
private governments. Yet a small business may still have sufficient power
to inflict grave harm on individual employees. Nevertheless, courts
would be unable to equate these businesses with the state, and therefore could not logically impose constitutional requirements on their
activities. Strict adherence to the "corporation as government" rationale
would preclude judicial intervention in cases of abuse by small businessmen. Absent some form of state action, the courts are incapable
of providing legal protection based on the Constitution. Therefore,
constitutional law appears too inflexible to solve the problems of the
employment relationship.
Effective control of employer invasions of constitutional rights
would entail a drastic extension of the state action concept. This type
of expansion might result in a fundamental alteration of our governmental system, ultimately placing constitutional restraints on all
forms of private activity. Given the Supreme Court's increasing concern for the protection of property interests-as exemplified in Moose
Lodge, Central Hardware and Tanner-it seems unlikely that acceptance of the imposition of constitutional restraints on private business
will be forthcoming.
137. Berle, supra note 135, at 943.
138. Id. at 951-52. "Whether the corporate privilege shall be granted or withheld
is always a matter of State policy. If granted, the privilege is conferred in order to
achieve an end which the state deems desirable." Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 545
(1933) (dissenting opinion).
139. Developments in the Law, supra note 100, at 1067-69.
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CONCLUSION

The fact that a constitutional job right may be neither feasible
nor desirable does not abrogate the need for employment protection.
The function of the Bill of Rights, along with the fourteenth amendment, is to protect the individual from injuries caused by wrongful
state action. Burdened by a strong presumption in favor of the legitimacy of governmental activity, constitutional law can only prevent
extraordinary abuse.14 0 In contrast, the institution of property is capable of performing the day-to-day function of protecting individual
rights from both private and public encroachment. 141 It has the flexibility to respond to societal changes, and the capacity to execute the
delicate task of balancing competing interests. Therefore, the creation
of a property right in a job may be the most appropriate means of imposing legal control on the employment relationship.
This proposed application of property law is based upon a recognition of the danger in which private enterprise places individual rights.
Governmental power is no longer the sole threat to liberty. It is, therefore, logical to extend the protection given other abstract interests so
as to encompass private employment. As long as no legal safeguards
are attached to a laborer's livelihood, his rights are placed in jeopardy.
It is essential, for the preservation of freedom, that man's most precious
possessions not be subject to arbitrary confiscation. Legal protection
must be afforded the worker's valuable interest in his employment.
The institution of property developed as a barrier to infringements
on liberty. It was a reaction to the feudal status system, where all possessions were conditionally held. Concepts of ownership were a means
of ensuring that private wealth would not be confiscated by the
sovereign. It meant a withdrawal of governmental authority to interfere with personal possessions. However, as individual resources enlarged, the property principle became corrupted. It became a force
for the preservation of the status quo, and a means by which the power142
ful maintained their control over others.
This disintegration is exemplified in the master-servant rule of
employment at will. Theoretically the concept of freedom of contract
has a neutral effect, allowing the parties to work out their own arrangements. However, in actual practice, the absence of legal inter140. Reich, supra note 5, at 771.

141. Id.
142. Id. at 772.
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vention benefits the stronger party, enabling him to dictate the terms
of the agreement. Thus, the at will standard places the worker completely within the employer's dominion. An employee, acting alone,
is generally incapable of effectively bargaining with the power of
management. The employer's control has few limitations, and can
be used to force the sacrifice of fundamental rights. Thus, the consequence of the imbalance inherent in the employment relationship may
be the destruction of the worker's liberty.
The courts must realize that the principle of freedom of contract is
no longer an adequate means of governing employment. Agreements
between employers and employees are determined by status, and are
not bargained for freely. The terms of these contracts should not be
afforded rigid adherence. Conditions, reflecting the public interest,
ought to be placed on the relationship.14 The imposition of these conditions would imply a judicial recognition of the public concern for
the preservation of the worker's rights. The employer's domination
would thus be limited by public policy considerations. However, the
scope of this limitation would be restricted. The employer would only
be deprived of his power to arbitrarily dismiss his employees; thus
curbing his freedom to exercise control of activities unrelated to the
job. However, the employer's legitimate business operations would
not be disturbed. He would not be forced to retain employees, when
there existed reasonable grounds for discharge. Any interference with
his ability to manage his business would be minimal in comparison
with the rights sought to be protected.
Thus, the dimensions of the newly created job right would be
strictly limited. The employer's interest in conducting his normal business affairs would be adequately safeguarded. Courts, in each case,
would weigh the employer's interest against the harm inflicted on the
employee, and the extent to which rights were violated. The substance of the right would be dependent upon the circumstances of the
individual case, varying with the size of the business and the disparity
of bargaining power. This balancing process would ensure that the
144
parties' interests would be protected.
143. Tobriner & Grodin, supranote 12, at 1251-54.
144. It is both undesirable, and beyond the scope of this comment, to delineate
the exact nature of the proposed right. Many factors would influence a judicial determination, and it would be impossible now to provide for every contingency. Specific
questions as to the dimensions of the right would best be resolved through a consideration of concrete facts, rather than abstractions.
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The remedy provided would not be identical in each situation. Reinstatement is to be preferred, since it restores the employee to his
former position, and thus comes closest to making him "whole." However, in many cases reinstatement will not be a feasible alternative.
Often the personal relations between the parties will be antagonistic,
based on occurrences surrounding the dismissal and the subsequent lawsuit. Under such circumstances, it would not be in the worker's best interest to mandate reinstatement. In those cases damages would be a
more appropriate remedy. Their main purpose would be to compensate for the injuries incident to dismissal. However, there should also
be a punitive element in order to deter future abuse. Although the
damages might be substantial, their aim would not be to cripple the employer's business operations. The goal of the remedy would be the enforcement of the right, minimizing the injury to the employee and
averting wrongful discharges.
The job property right would have to be created through a
gradual development; the product of a step-by-step process of formation, with practical experience guiding the future course. The common
law, with its emphasis on precedent, is amenable to this cautious adjustment of existing standards. Any drastic alteration of the employment relationship would tend to unnecessarily impinge on legitimate
interests. Courts are reluctant to accept radical changes, with uncertain consequences in other areas of law. However, an argument emphasizing judicial recognition of analogous interests might be more convincing. The stress would then be shifted from the breaking of new
ground, with its attendant dangers, to a more conservative notion
of merely extending established principles from other branches of the
legal system. The borrowing of ideas from other fields of law would also
be beneficial in providing guidelines for determining the nature of the
new property right. The essential elements of the right would evolve
from a practical consideration of specific instances of abuse. Judicial
acceptance would most likely arise from a strong prima facie case of
harm, without economic justification. A statement of facts of sufficient
detail to enable the court to strike a proper balance between the competing interests would be necessary. The high degree of specificity will
also allow the court to place strict limitations on the scope of their
holding, thus allaying any fear of revolutionary consequences. The
result of a series of favorable decisions would be the establishment
of legal protection of employment.
PHILIP J. LEVINE
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